

AFFORDING US THE WORLD

'While I was speaking to him I did not know what was going on in his head.' In saying this one is not thinking of brain-processes, but of thought processes. The picture should be taken seriously. We would really like to see into his head. And yet we only mean what elsewhere we would mean in saying we would like to know what he is thinking. (*Investigations* §427)

In *The Threefold Cord*, in describing the faulty underpinnings of the bad side of internal realism, Hilary says he once thought of

perceptual inputs [as] the outer limit of our cognitive processing: everything that lies beyond those inputs is connected to our mental processes only causally, not cognitively. (p. 16)

In which case there is this problem:

What my 'model theoretic argument' showed is that interpretations of our language—even ones that make true the very sentences that are 'really true', true from a 'God's eye view' (assuming [this] makes sense)—can agree on what these inputs are while disagreeing wildly on what our terms actually refer to. (Ibid)

On the idea that there was some sort of problem here he now comments,

How could the question 'How does language hook onto the world?' even appear to pose a difficulty unless the retort: 'How can there be a problem about talking about, say, houses and trees when we see them all the time?' had not already been rejected in advance as question-begging or 'hopelessly naïve'? (p. 12)

This need one can feel to construct our relations to windfall cherries, or bowls of them, or peccaries on our path, out of something inside a boundary of the sort Putnam mentions, with perceptual inputs stationed along them, sentinels looking out at something beyond, is an expression of a difficulty Wittgenstein expresses in another context like this:

It is so difficult to find the *beginning*. Or, better: it is difficult to begin

at the beginning. And not try to go further back. (*On Certainty*, §471)

Here the felt need to start too far back manifests itself as a compulsion to look inside the head for what is to be found in the world around us; specifically, to look there for what it is we (*really*) respond to in—as we call it—seeing some cherries. This *Drang* (henceforth ‘The *Drang*’) runs very deep through much of philosophy of mind. It has various tributaries. It is easy enough to cut off one or several while leaving the *Drang* in place. What makes for it is not yet well understood.

1. Seeing is a form—visual—of awareness of one’s (spatial) surroundings. Sight *affords* awareness of some of what is there, or there happening. Seeing that dirty cup on the counter, just after having started the dishwasher, is enjoying some of what vision places on offer. Seeing it to be a cup, or even an object (an integral piece of drygoods) is a further achievement, tied, as Frege says, to thinking and judging (1897: 53). Following the cup’s career is yet another. Seeing places all this in reach. It remains *au courant*, as testimony does not.

The question what it is to see a bowl of cherries thus asks us to fasten on *that* item, and ask how we are privileged with access to how *it* is when, and in, seeing it. *What* we see would then be no more than is in our surroundings, and in view. What sensitivity to *that* would we enjoy in seeing it? That would be the question.

It is thus remarkable that, from about the time Montaigne read Sextus to a bit after VE day—three centuries plus—nearly no one thought that strategy worth a glance. When, e.g., in the late ‘30s, H. A. Prichard wrote “Perception”, one was entitled to take for granted that this approach was wrong. Prichard begins,

I assume that ‘perception’ is a word used for the genus of which what we call seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling or touching are the species” (1950: 52)

All well so far. He then remarks that in the “everyday attitude of mind” of both philosophers and non-philosophers, one counts “‘chairs and tables, boats going downstream, and so forth” as the sorts of things one sees. But, he announces, and only barely argues, this obviously will not do:

It need hardly be said that this view, much as we should all like to be able to vindicate it, will not stand examination. (Ibid: 53)

Argument is sparse and shaky. Prichard was unusual among philosophers of perception in several respects. But not in this one. What we need to do, on the research

strategy he is determined to follow, is not to ask, of the cherries before me, how I am sensitive to *them* in seeing *them*, but rather to ask what *else* it is to which visual experience might allow me to be sensitive. To Prichard's credit, he realized that such a something else would have to be available to my awareness only, and hence could not be an object of judgement. Cook Wilson had at least that much good effect.

2. There are various perception-specific roots of Prichard's amazing research strategy—the argument from illusion, in various forms, among them. There is failure to see how *special* the uses of language on which 'N saw O' does not imply O's presence in the scene. There is also a general attitude towards philosophical good faith expressed in finding it unremarkable that we could all, pre-philosophically, be *that* wrong as to what we *saw*. But The *Drang* is not confined to perception. It surfaces in views of thinking things so. Michael Dummett expresses it. In his 'inadvertent' book on Frege, in a chapter really more about Kripke, he writes:

The content of a belief appears to depend, not on the mode of presentation as determined by commonly agreed linguistic convention, together with the relevant circumstances, but on the connection which the individual subject makes between the expression and its referent ...

An accurate characterization of a speaker's belief requires an account of his personal understanding of the words by means of which he expresses it ... When we follow our usual procedure of characterizing someone's belief by means of a sentence considered as having the meaning that it does in the language to which it belongs, we are very often giving only an approximate statement of the content of that belief. (1981: 115-116)

Parallel to the obvious strategy for studying what it is to see a bowl of cherries, the obvious strategy for studying what it is to think something would be first to ask what there *is* to think or not, and then, of some given thinker, which of *these* things he does think. First ask: 'What is it that might *be* so or not?', then, 'Of that, what does N *think* so?' I mention something to be thought, and say someone to think *that*; as a rule there is no issue of approximation. (Frege gives us excellent reasons for thinking of thinking in this way. I leave them unmentioned here.)

Again, though, there is something that makes that obvious strategy seem—and not just to Dummett—hardly worth a second look. Instead, to see what someone thinks, we need to look inside his head. It is not the world he thinks about, but views of it from a vantage point you would have to be him to enjoy, which determines what he 'really' thinks—now not a matter of his answer to the question whether there are cherries.

Jerry Fodor feels the *Drang*. On his view, for me to think there is a peccary on the

path is for me to bear a certain relation to something *literally* in the head. In the (English) sentence 'There is a peccary on the path', there is a string of letters beginning with 'T' and ending with 'h'. (The obvious one.) That string is the string it is independent of any considerations of how it is to be understood. If a given instance of that string is also an instance of the sentence 'There is a peccary on the path', then, as an instance of that sentence (but not just as that string) it is to be understood in a certain way. Similarly, on Fodor's view to think something is to relate to something with an identity entirely independent of anything to do with representing; which thing also, as it happens, is to be taken in a certain way—does, in fact, have some representational properties. That something has whatever representational features that subject's contact with the world has happened to bestow on it. Its having the features it does is very much a part of that subject's particular vicissitudes. At the same time, that something belongs to a language—a systematically structured collection of such somethings—and, as such, represents as it does by virtue of its place in that system. The remarkable thing is now that that system of such somethings just happens to draw just those distinctions which are drawn by the distinctions there are between one Fregean sense and another. Here there really are the problems Putnam pointed to in his development of Skolem's thought.

Fodor is, of course, moved by proprietary factors, notably by a misguided sense of naturalism. That is why I began here with Dummett, who is certainly not in thrall to any *such* compulsion. Though they may understand 'in the head' differently, Dummett and Fodor share a view of the work what is in the head would have to do. There must be deeper roots. My candidate is the idea that there is such a thing as '*the* distinctions there are between one Fregean sense and another.' For the moment I merely point out the parallel.

3. Hilary is sometimes too modest. In *Cord* he records having learned from Austin how to resist one sort of temptation to look inside the head (for what in fact is located outside it). Austin did much, I think, to show us how there is no need to look anywhere but in the environment to find what it is that we see (more generally, encounter, are made aware of, in perception). But even before discovering Austin, Hilary taught us some very valuable lessons in how to resist temptations to look elsewhere. I will now introduce a particular such temptation, and then say briefly how Hilary defuses it. I will appeal to an idea which, in *Cord*, he presents as 'the face of perception'. But the idea is much deeper, and longer standing, in his thought than that title for it.

One can introduce the temptation by asking how we differ from cats. There is the business of the tails, and so on. But when we are done with that, it seems we may need a look inside. Cats do not see the world as we do. Let us grant, for the moment, that there is a sense in which they are not thinkers (*rational* animals) at all. (As usual in philosophy, 'rational' now takes on a special meaning. You can't reason with my cat. You can't reason with Aunt Ida either. Aunt Ida is just not rational. But not in the sense in which, here, a cat is meant not to be.) The point about cats can be put this way: cats are Pyrrhonian. Things may seem to them certain ways. Feline constitution naturally inclines them to respond to seemings in certain ways. Seemingly something large approaches. The cat dives beneath a hedge. Natural inclinations thus guide the cat. But

here 'guide' can only mean *cause* it to do things. For that is all a natural inclination can accomplish. We, by contrast, are thinkers, that is, judges in Frege's sense: we take truth-evaluable attitudes towards things. To judge is to hold true (or so). It is just when I stand in that way towards something being so that its being so bears, for me, on what to think and do as its being so in fact bears on what is to be done and what it is right to think (insofar as I grasp this bearing). That there is a peccary on the path may be good reason for me to think I am in Oxfordshire, given its bearing on the excess wealth of the local landed. But it is reason for *me* so to think only insofar as I take the fact in.

So we have this situation. In fact there is a peccary on the path. In fact, this means I am in Oxfordshire. I judge there to be a peccary on the path. I know that peccaries about means I am in Oxfordshire. But we need a link between the first fact about the peccary, and the first fact about me. That there is a peccary on the path must make this the thing for me to think. Seeing is to forge that link. I see the peccary; in my seeing it, that there is one becomes the thing for me to think.

The core difference between me and a cat (on present assumptions) is that the cat is Pyrrhonian, I am a judger. But now this can seem to call for a further difference in the nature of our experience. For, in thinking of the link just mentioned, one might think like this. What *really* makes it rational for me to judge there to be a peccary is *the fact* that there is a peccary. If my visual experience is to make that fact bear for me on what to think, then it must provide—make me aware of—something shaped as that fact is for me to respond to with that attitude. For, the thought would be, it is hard to see how anything not so shaped could bear a *rational* relation to whether to think there to be a peccary. So, it may seem, in seeing the scene before me I gain something to respond to that the cat does not—am made aware of something that the cat is not. Such an object of awareness is shaped just as my thoughts are. So, the thought goes, it is shaped by what shapes my thoughts.

So that I am a judger and the cat not now seems to entail a further difference: what I experience in seeing the scene is other than what the cat does—in *experiencing the same scene*. This forces us to look inward for the difference. The difference, we have decided already, is the upshot of conceptual capacities I, but not the cat, enjoy. Now, of course, if the cat and I are watching an approaching game warden, I may experience an uneasiness the cat does not—despite the bird in its mouth. The shiver going up my spine, but not the cat's, would be a difference in what we experience. The cat may thank its lack of conceptual capacities for its aplomb. But if the difference in what we experience is conceived as a difference in what we experience *visually*—how we (thus) experience things *being* visually—my conceptual capacities are responsible for differences in the cat's, and my, objects of *perception*—in this case, sight. And then it seems—there being only one *scene* for the cat and me to gaze at—those differences will have to be found by looking inside. (My conceptual capacities certainly do not shape the peccary. If they shape any object of perception, it will have to be one found where no peccary can tread.) We are now adrift, cut off from the world. (To give conceptual capacities *this* role would be to stand in a venerable tradition going back to Kant.)

4. Hilary is, in a number of ways, an antidote to any such drive to look inward to find

what is experienced. I begin with what seems most important for the present purpose. Grant that cats are Pyrrhonian, we judgers, and not vice-versa. By the preceding line, it is meant to follow that visual experience must provide us different things to respond to than it provides the cat. Hilary shows why it does not.

Cats do not judge, and we do, the thought is, because they lack certain capacities we have: *conceptual* capacities. So it takes conceptual capacities to judge. The idea, in brief, is: to judge is to commit to things being a certain way; to do that one must grasp what it would be for things to be that way—when, that is, they would so count. Hilary shows what is contained in such a grasp; hence what judging requires. Now, one good idea about judging is that we could not *judge* as to how (which ways) our surroundings are—so much as make intelligible *commitments* as to this—unless experience were able to make the way those surroundings are bear, for us, on how to think them; bear for us, that is, according as *what* we experience bears on what is *so*. And the idea, of which Hilary will help disabuse us, is that in order to do that experience must provide us *objects* of experience differing from those feline experience supplies a cat. Any such idea, I have suggested, is disastrous.

In *Cord* Hilary makes the right point with an image borrowed from Cora Diamond. Long before that, though, he made the point without that image. Seeing this will help see how he matters to present matters. The image is of a *face* of a concept (or of a way for things, or for something, to be). Applying that image (before developing it), a conceptual capacity would be one to see the *face* of being such-and-such way in its indefinite potential manifestations in things, or some thing, being as they are/it is. Following Wittgenstein, Hilary develops the image, in *Cord*, in terms of games. When would a game be a form of poker? Is there a recipe for this? There need not be. If I invent a game, like central cases of poker in some respects, but which one can play by oneself, to a *Spielkenner's* eye—the eye of someone with a proper sense for what *matters* in poker—my invention might just be recognisable as another form of poker, or as not that. What ways for things to be we have in mind when we ask whether something would count as (being) such-and-such, which particular cases are cases of these things, does not float independent of what the *Kenner*—the person with a proper sense for things—would find. This is one crucial point.

To see how central this idea has always been to Hilary, consider another example. Newtonian mechanics speaks of a physical quantity called kinetic energy. Relativistic mechanics speaks of a quantity called energy. Are both these theories thus speaking of *energy*? We can recognize the face of a concept, *energy*, in what both speak of. That *is* an answer. There is no other. (On this see my other contribution to this volume.) Which should make the centrality of the idea apparent.

On the points so far Hilary is one with Wittgenstein, though not Wittgenstein as read when Hilary first made them. And, I suppose, he is one with all at this roundtable. In *Cord* Hilary uses the point against Michael Dummett's conception of how a concept stands to its applications. But for technical details which do not matter here (the difference between rules and axioms), he might equally well be making it against Paul Feyerabend, or against any of many other people. On Dummett's account a concept is fixed by (given, identifiable) rules for its introduction and elimination. Any different rules would *ipso facto* govern a different concept. If we think of a concept, as we may, as

intrinsically of a given way for things to be—of being round, say—then, equally, a way for things to be is fixed by such rules. It is the way things would be just in case those rules licensed counting things being as they are as things being that way. Again, different rules *ipso facto* speak of a different way for things to be. If this is so, then if Newton spoke of energy, Einstein did not, and vice versa. To which Hilary says in *Cord*,

The difference between Dummett's Wittgenstein and Diamond's Wittgenstein parallels the difference we saw earlier between Dummett and myself. Dummett wants to say that the rules for the application of expressions such as 'too small to see' change with the invention of the microscope, and therefore the meanings of the expressions change, or rather they are given new meanings in their new contexts of use. I want to say that the question is not one of distinguishing between the 'rules' of the activity of using words and components of the activity that are not 'rules', and that here too the question is one of our ways of 'seeing the face' of one activity in another. (1999: 64)

A concept is not identified by any given set of principles, or rules, in the way Dummett (along with many others) supposes. It may be that it applies (is satisfied) according to such-and-such principles, given the occasion there in fact will be (or in fact can be) for applying it. But its applications are not bound by any such principles in the sense that whatever applied differently simply would not be that concept, no matter what. Different occasions for applying it are liable to require different principles of application. Or at least the concept being, and being of, what it is always leaves room for that.

I will make Hilary's point in several ways before I am done—just now by asking after how *recognition* capacities relate to conceptual capacities. The image, *face of ...*, appeals to resemblances with the phenomenon of facial recognition. One can recognise a human face, or, again, a similarity between faces within a given family, or between Pia's face and, say, Nicole Kidman's. One can recognise Pia's face across the span of a lifetime, and through a wide range of distortions life, or beauticians, may inflict on it. Just at this point, there is an idea which can spoil the comparison sought for. Facial recognition is a topic for psychologists. It is not obvious what allows us to see right away that that is David Soul at the next table, 20 years after his last appearance. But a psychologist might find out. The idea is precisely to look for features, to which we are sensitive, and which remain constant across the years. It is no mean intellectual achievement to find them. But they can be found. One *might* try to conceive the concepts, to which Hilary applies the image, on this model: what features remain constant across all the cases of what would fit the concept is not evident. It would be a considerable intellectual achievement to find them. But they are there, and may be found.

This would spoil the image, which was to be one of there being, in some sense, *no* features in common to all the cases where a concept applies—except that they are all ones of being that which the concept is a concept of—a way for things, or for

something, to be—and are all recognisable as one by a *Kenner*—one with a proper sense for such things. But the image is not spoiled if we attend to what success for the psychologist would be. The psychologist identifies features which *do* allow us to recognise a face, as encountered in the circumstances in which we might encounter it. It would be good enough, perhaps more than that, if he could do that much. Working according to our sensitivity to those features, we can count as having a *capacity* to tell a face. For *most* things there are to recognise, any *such* capacity is liable to stop being that in a hostile environment. Perhaps you can recognise Pia by her face. But perhaps not if everyone has plastic surgery so as to look just like her; or if she has radical enough plastic surgery so as not to. The surgery would not detract from the psychologist's achievement. That the capacity he seeks is one liable to fail is what makes that achievement possible in the first place.

A *conceptual* capacity positions us to do something a recognition capacity, as just conceived, would not. It positions us to recognise when a given recognition capacity—an ability to tell peccaries, say, when you see one—has ceased to be that. It allows us to make sense of the idea that, while it would be a peccary if this were decided by those features to which the some-time recognition capacity is sensitive, for all that it is not one. I have described a cognitive achievement to which a psychologist might aspire, *in re* recognising someone's face. We need not suppose that a parallel achievement is in the cards when it comes to recognising when a recognition capacity like that for faces would have failed—what it might be for something to have *those* features, but not be a peccary, or Pia's face. There may be all sorts of things that could make a situation count as one which was that way. And now we have the wanted image. Someone—the *Kenner*—may *have* the capacity to recognise what our *conceptual* capacities position us to see, to make the right sense, on the right occasion, of those situations these capacities allow us to understand; but there need be nothing external to his sense for such things, standing towards *what* he is prepared to recognise as those very abstract features of faces stand towards an instance of the face, to which a *Kenner's* sense could be held accountable. This is a form of an idea which, I think, has informed much of what is most exciting in John's philosophy.

How, if this is right, would a conceptual capacity relate to a recognition capacity, construed, as above, as a proper subject for psychology? Such a recognition capacity would be exhausted by some set of principles governing its operations; the conceptual capacity would not. What this need not mean, though, is that a conceptual capacity is, intrinsically, sensitive to things of a very different shape than a recognition capacity might be. We tell pigs by their looks. We are sensitive to the presence of a certain look. We can thus tell pigs when we see them, at sight. When we tell, of a particular case, that it is what would be, or not, a case of things being such-and-such way, we need not be telling by, or sensitive to, anything very different in kind. Experience—say, visual experience—cannot make the world bear on what we are to think unless it engages with our conceptual capacities. It must provide that to which such capacities are sensitive; that by which we can *see* the reason there is to think that, say, there is a pig before us—perhaps just that there is one. But such capacities need not be different in kind from those which allow us to tell a pig when we see one. And, I will suggest, for that they need not bring any more into view than *might* be in view for a cat too when confronted by a pig (abstracting from here-boring details of feline optics). This is *one*

way to spell out Hilary's point. Now for another. (Some, I am afraid, are about to leave the boat.)

5. The above point about conceptual capacities, and their relation to recognition capacities, conceived as subjects for the psychologist, is so important that I am going to put it in another form. Frege found something *intrinsically* general about a thought—a particular way for a posture towards the world to make *its* correctness, independent of any taking of it, turning *entirely* on how things are. Frege expressed the point thus:

A thought always contains something which reaches out beyond the particular case, by which it presents this to consciousness as falling under a certain generality. (1882: *Kernsatz* 4)

A thought *demand*s something of the particular case for its being as represented. It cannot, the idea is, demand *everything*; that is, that the particular case be *just* the way it is. One can put this by saying that, for principled reasons, it must be so that things *could have* been represented as any given thought represents them without their *being* precisely as they are. Not *everything* in how things are matters to whether one could represent them as any given thought does; not everything, thus, matters to whether they *are* as represented. This is to say that if the particular case *is* as represented, if it is the way it was represented to be, then it instances (realises) things being that way in only one of an indefinite variety of ways this could be done. If the pig is in the sty while Pia prepares a daube, then there is also a way for the pig to be in the sty while Pia suns herself in the *chaise longue*. There is a *range* of cases in which things being as they were would be their being such that the pig is in the sty. There is a generality—something for a particular case to be—which reaches just to that range. Such is the generality under which the thought that the pig is in the sty brings the particular case. Such is the intrinsic generality of thoughts.

The particular case is that which the thought represents as a certain way. Which is just: things being as they are. Things being as they are, so far as that goes, does not bring anything under any given generality; or present anything to consciousness as so falling. If it presented anything to consciousness, that could only be itself. It cannot be instanced in an indefinite *variety* of ways. If we were to speak of it as instanced at all, that would have to be only by itself. But that would be at best a degenerate use of 'instance'. In fact, it is not *instanced* by anything. For it makes itself hostage to nothing for correctness. It is neither correct nor incorrect (except in the sense that it is just *so* wrong for Bush to be president). All of which is to say: it reaches to no range of cases; it has no reach. The generality of a thought consists its representing things as some way that might be instanced in an indefinite variety of ways. What does the instancing *has* no such generality. If we call what has this generality (*the*) *conceptual*, we might call what lacks it (*the*) *nonconceptual*.

Frege further tells us,

The fundamental logical relation is that of an object falling under a concept. All relations between concepts are reducible to this. (1892-1895: 25)

Frege's notion of a concept is of something at the level of reference, not sense (in his sense)—the level at which, for him, a thought belongs. He does not quite manage to invest his notion with that generality which marks a thought. But, as he does insist, a thought, on any decomposition of it, has some element—some proper contribution to the thought's doing what it does—which shares the generality of a thought (in fact, whose generality the thought restricts in some way), which is being about a way there is for *something* to be, so under which those objects which are that way may be said to fall. Such elements identify one thing we might call, and what I here will call, a concept.

If an object is that way for something to be which identifies the concept—the way it, or that element in thoughts which identifies it, represents things—we may speak of that object as falling under the concept. For an object to fall under a concept in this sense is for its being as it is to be it being the way that concept represents a thing; or, equally, for things being as they are to be this object being that way. The object's being as it is thus *instances* what the concept is a concept of, or, in shorthand, simply the concept.

An object's being as it is belongs to the nonconceptual. So the fundamental relation Frege speaks of can be read as, or as mirroring, an at least equally fundamental relation between the conceptual and the nonconceptual. This relation is fundamental, *inter alia*, in this way: if we are to be thinkers on whose thinking the world may bear *rationally*—so if we are to be thinkers at all—then we had better be able to recognise instances of its holding. One could not so much as have the conceptual in view (or in mind) without such competence. Perhaps being a crisp entails being greasy. But one does not grasp *that* fact (or thought) without an adequate grasp on what an instance of a crisp, or being greasy, would be. Absent any grasp of how these concepts reach, what would make it being a *crisp* and *greasy* that one is thinking of? (This is another point Hilary has made unmistakable for us. Take any structure of internal relations, such as entailments, between concepts, divorced from any identification of the reach of these concepts to the nonconceptual, and the 'concepts' remain mere tags: *nothing* in such a structure can make the tags reach to some one set of cases—bring things under some one generality—rather than indefinitely many others. Such is the message of "Models and Reality".

A recognition capacity in the present sense—an ability to recognise a pig at sight, say—would be a capacity to recognise the reach of the conceptual to the nonconceptual. One sees, and recognises, instances of something being a pig. By the same token, so would a conceptual capacity in the present sense. As it had better be to be a *conceptual* capacity at all. For it is, *inter alia*, an ability to recognise the limits of any given recognition capacity. So if we have recognition capacities, and their corresponding conceptual capacities, we are in shape to be thinkers; to think things of the world we inhabit. And, I think, only if that. I further think we can feel safe here.

Perception's *essential* role in the life of a *thinker* is to allow the world bear, for him,

on what he is to think according to the bearing of what that thinker is aware of on what is so. It thus does such things as allowing the presence of the pig before me to bear, for me, on whether to think *that* there is a pig there. For it to serve this role requires nothing less than for it to bring the nonconceptual—that which the world provides—within reach of our recognition (so conceptual) capacities. Perhaps an easy way to see this is this. Perhaps that a pig is in the sty means that the farmer is home. Perhaps perception—vision, in this case—allows me to see that a pig is in the sty. If it accomplishes this much, then it has brought that fact about the world to bear on what I am to think: if I also see enough of factive meaning, the thing for me to think is that the farmer is home. But if that were *all* perception accomplished, or the only accomplishment to its credit, it would not have fulfilled its appointed role. For (see above discussion), if the pig is in the sty, this is so in just *one* particular way of the indefinitely many ways there are for it to be so—e.g., the pig sleeping in the mud, or standing by the railings. What perception must make available to me, to make the world bear on my thinking as it is perception's job to make it bear, is *the way* in which that general way for things to be, a pig being in the sty, is instanced by things being as they are. This it can only do by bringing the nonconceptual in view; making it available for exercise by me of my recognition, and conceptual capacities.

Such is needed, for one thing, if perception is to allow me to see how *this case* of a pig being in the sty bears on what else is so. Perhaps, often, a pig in the sty is black pudding on the way; but not when it is this prize pig, or the neighbour's pig—the sort of sizing up I must be positioned for if that pig in the sty is to get its full bearing, for me, on what to think and do—e.g., whether to gather apples for the *geitespek*. More crucially, it is the pig's presence in the sty that bears on whether there is a pig before me. If I am to take it, fully rationally, simply on grounds of what I see, that there is a pig before me, seeing must confront me with nothing less than the pig's presence, in its full glory, as it were: things being as they are, at least at that place where the pig is present. I must be able to see, e.g., just what sort of thing it is that is the pig in the sty here; just *how* it is. One reason is this: suppose it is a piglet, or a pot-bellied pig, or a tusked wild boar that is in the sty; or, again, a pig carcass, or just the hind quarters of the pig, the rest of it in that crib of corn, or the baby's crib. *Is* the way things are the pig being in the sty? That depends on what you understand by a pig being in a sty. Such is one sort of question over which it is perception's job to allow me to exercise my *savoir-faire*, or cultivated sensibility.

So perception makes—and must make—the way things are bear, for me, on how to think things are through positioning me, *inter alia*, to exercise my abilities, such as they are, to recognise instances of (the image of) what Frege calls the fundamental logical relation—that between the nonconceptual and the conceptual where the first instances the last. Now for Putnam's point. Conceptual capacities need not reduce to recipes; to recognition capacities insofar as these are tractable problems for psychology, as conceived above. It need not always be that for a concept to fit is for what it fits to have a certain constellation of (perhaps highly abstract) features. Conceptual capacities are liable to rely, at least for some purposes, on an irreducible sense for how the nonconceptual would connect to some given bit of the conceptual. It will do for the exercise of such capacities to have access, notably perceptual access, to the nonconceptual which is to be related to one or another bit of the conceptual. Indeed, as

we have just seen, often nothing less than such access will do for full exercise of such *irreducible* capacities.

Indeed, as we have seen, conceptual capacities *cannot* always reduce to recipes. Just maybe, a conceptual capacity *in re* being a bachelor reduces to capacities to recognise when something's being as it is would count as its being male, and when it would count as its being married. But then, what of these capacities? If *all* our conceptual capacities were thus reducible, we would be in that position which "Models and Reality" showed to be impossible: a position in which all there was to bring the conceptual within our view was internal relations between bits of it—a structure identified independent of how anything it structures reaches to the nonconceptual. In that position, thought vanishes entirely from our lives.

If conceptual capacities were all reducible, it might do for perception merely to bring bits of the conceptual to bear on our thought; merely to afford us awareness of them (if we can even really make sense of this idea). But our conceptual capacities do not work like that, which is another reason that perception cannot have done its job if it falls short of bringing the nonconceptual in view. Conversely, it would be fine for it to do just that. Exercising our capacities to recognise what would count as things being one or another given way, we can then supply relevant bits of the conceptual ourselves. This is what Frege had in mind when he wrote:

Although a law of nature obtains quite independently of whether we think of it or not, it does not emit light or sound waves by which our visual or auditory nerves could be affected. But don't I see that this flower has five petals? One can say that; but then uses the word 'see' not in the sense of mere perception by means of light, but something involving thought and judgement. (1897: 53)

The pig before me, when I see it, is what allows me to see—recognise, register—that there is a pig before me. Perception need only bring the pig in view. The rest lies in my capacities for knowing what it is I see—when perception has brought a pig in view; when it thus makes that there is a pig before me the thing for me to judge.

6. Which expressions, on which faces, are ones of grief? Which circumstances would be ones in which Newton and Einstein spoke of the same physical quantity (one truly, one falsely) in speaking of 'energy'? Answers to such questions are not provided simply by things being as they are. It takes a *Kenner* to see them. Just for this reason, experience must supply us with something for a *Kenner's* capacities to work on. Just for that reason, perception must do no less, and need do no more, than bring the nonconceptual into view. Some philosophers, such as Gareth Evans and Christopher Peacocke, have missed this point. [[cites??]] For them, perception could make the world bear on what we are to think *only* by presenting us with recognisable bits of the conceptual. Peacocke puts it this way:

By perceiving the world, we frequently learn whether a judgement with a given conceptual content is true or not. This is possible only because a perceptual experience has a correctness condition whose holding may itself exclude, or require, the truth of a conceptual content. (1992: 66)

It is thus for experience to make something conceptual do the *world's* bearing on what we are to think—a hopeless assignment. For Evans and Peacocke, that assignment is to be carried out in experience representing things as so—for reasons we have seen, again a hopeless project.

Such a view inevitably sends us searching inward looking for the *real*, or first, objects of visual awareness. Why? Suppose that visual experience provided (visual) awareness merely of what was before one's eyes—a scene. Bracketing billboards and the like, scenes do not represent anything as so. For a scene to do that, it, just in being as it is, would have to fix some generality under which it presented things—presumably just itself—as falling. It would have to reach in a particular way to what were to be instances of things being as it represented them. As we saw in setting out the conceptual-nonconceptual distinction, such a thing is just not on. On the other hand, if experience representing things as so is to be the route by which it makes the world (or anything) bear *for me* on what I am to think, then it must be recognisable to me just *what* way my experience represents things to be—in a fairly minimal sense: I must be able to say of the way I find things, and perhaps of ways I might, that, given this, my experience was *right* (*casu quo* wrong) as to how things were. My experiencing, visually, what I do must make this so recognisable. My experiencing, visually, the *scene* will not turn the trick. So I must experience, visually, something else—just what Evans provides, or tries to, in making perceptual experience an *internal state*, whose content we get at by asking ourselves certain questions as to how, in it, things seem to us—answers to which float entirely free (in principle) of how the scene in view *is*, or how *it* seems.

Evans and Peacocke are on a hopeless, though as we have also seen, needless, search. A search for what distinguishes us from cats (more generally, Pyrrhonian creatures) *can* send us on a similar, and, I think, similarly doomed, search. The idea would be: for non-Pyrrhonian creatures like us, conceptual capacities would have to shape *something* in experience. Kant thought they shaped reality itself, taking reality to be just what there is to experience, and to judge of—things being as they are. (Kant thought they shaped only a special tract of reality. But I bracket that.) So, for Kant, they shaped precisely the only objects of (our) perception there are or could be. But suppose that, while holding the general view, you reject the idea that conceptual capacities can shape a peccary. So they do not shape reality in this sense. So, if there *is* any perception, they do not shape its objects—what is perceived, e.g., the scene before you. Now you are on your way inward, I have suggested, looking for what they do shape.

Of course, with Putnam and Frege on board, conceptual capacities are still located *somewhere* in experience. Frege put things rightly. They are located in our responses to what we experience (perceptually): in our recognising what we do *in* that which we

experience, e.g., visually, that of which *sight* affords awareness—such things as a case of a pig in a sty. But now, suppose we do not want to locate conceptual capacities merely there. One insists on their shaping the very things which, by means of our senses, or at least in perceiving perceptually, we experience. Then we are, inevitably, on our way inward. We must end up in something like Evans' position, in which perceptual experiences are internal states.

I want to end, then, by posing a question to John. It is a question, not an accusation: I am not at all confident I understand him on the relevant point. But the question is whether John is not committed to (a very subtle version, to be sure) of that same gaze inward that I located in Evans. A text which raises this question—and which I think I don't understand—is a response to Hubert Dreyfus, entitled "What Myth?". In it, John takes up the question what distinguishes us from cats. (I take bits of this out of order.) He writes,

My experience might disclose to me that an opening in a wall is big enough for me to go through. A cat might see that an opening in a wall is big enough for it to go through. My experience would be world-disclosing and so conceptual in form in the sense I have introduced. The cat's perceptual intake would not be world-disclosing and so, in the relevant sense, not conceptual in form. It is irrelevant to this difference between the cases that there is that match in what the cat and I would be getting to know through the exercise of our perceptual capacities. (Ms.: 11)

The match between the cat and John is: both would come to know that an opening in the wall is big enough. The difference is that John's experience would be 'world-disclosing', the cat's not. For the moment, let 'world-disclosing' be a place-holder for what distinguishes feline from human experience. Anyway, John tells us, that difference has a consequence. John's perceptual intake is, in a certain sense, 'conceptual in form'. Not the cat's. So John takes in, perceptually, something the cat does not. He thus experiences, *perceptually*, e.g., visually, something the cat does not. I do not think John means something like, the cat experiences things being all bright and shiny, John their being all dull and matte-finished, or that, where John sees a hole in the wall, the cat draws a blank, or sees what looks as though it is bricked-up. I note that if what John takes in, perceptually, is just what he sees, or what is before his eyes, then, since it is the same *scene* John and the cat see, their perceptual intake is so far the same. I note too that that the whole in the wall is big enough for a philosopher to pass through, or just that there is a hole, is not *in* the scene, as the whole itself is. (Cf. Frege on petals.)

It *looks* as if other passages give a clue to what John has in mind. Here are two:

Granting that belief-formation, on the part of a rational animal, is an

exercise of the animal's rationality, why should we suppose rationality must be operative also in the constitution of that to which perceptual belief-formation is rationally responsive? ... Perceptual experiencing, on the part of a rational animal, is not just something that can elicit rational responses in the shape of perceptual beliefs. ... the perceptual experiencing of rational animals is itself rational openness to the world — which includes openness to affordances, as I have been insisting. So capacities that belong to a subject's rationality must be operative in the subject's experiencing itself, not just in responses to it. (Ms: 7-8)

What is important is this: if an experience is world-disclosing ... all its content is present in a form in which ... it is suitable to constitute contents of conceptual capacities. (Ms: 10)

So perceptual experiencing of rational animals—us and not cats—is 'rational openness to the world.' This is, presumably, another form of the distinction John is getting at with the term 'world-disclosing.' This requires, he tells us, that a subject's rationality must be operative in his experiencing itself, not just in responses to it. Which means, on the above line of thought, that it is operative in *constituting* "that to which perceptual belief formation is rationally responsive." I take it that perceptual belief formation is belief formation on the basis of what is experienced; so that what it is responsive to is that which is perceptually experienced.

Why should one seem to see such connections? Suppose that *what* I experience perceptually—by sight—is just the trail before me, that peccary glaring at me, half turned in my direction. I might respond to that in recognising what I thus see as a case of a peccary being on the (or a) trail before me. *That* is a rational response to what I see, as I—I claim Hilary and I—insist. It exercises my ability to link up the nonconceptual with the conceptual, to register instances of Frege's fundamental logical relation (or its mirror, as constructed above). So far, my conceptual capacities have no role in constituting *what* I respond to. For them to do that, they would have to constitute, in part, the peccary, or its glare, or something of this sort.

But John thinks—or *seems* to think (this is a question)—that my perceptual intake, what I respond to, what I apply my capacities to in forming beliefs based on it, must be 'conceptual in form', or 'in a form suitable to constitute the content of conceptual capacities'. So it could not just be the peccary, poised as it is, or its pawing of the path, or etc. It is tempting, I confess, to read this as an idea that what I, but not the cat, *perceive*, that of which I am afforded visual awareness, or some of it, belongs to the *conceptual*, rather than the nonconceptual, as if it were such things as *being on a path*, a way there *is* for something to be. Behind which it is also tempting, I confess, to find a picture on which, for my benefit, but not the cat's, the world is presented articulated into those particular ways for *things* to be (catholic sense—do not ask which ones), or for something to be, which things *are*, or something is, in things (in the scene before me) being as they are. What would make such an idea attractive (to the extent that it can be)

would be the idea that only something of conceptual form could bear *rationally* on questions of what to think (or of what is *so*)—the very idea which moves Evans and Peacocke to their own form of cutting us off irretrievably from the world.

I hope, and expect, that I am reading John wrongly. In any event, there is this to say about the above ideas. First, as Frege saw, the idea of encountering the conceptual *perceptually* makes no sense. This is what Frege is getting at when he observes that, while the sun, or a flower, is a visible thing, emitting rays arriving in our eyes, that the sun has set, or that the flower has five petals is not. It is not before us to be seen. Neither are ways there are for a thing to be. They are something else entirely. Second, the world, or that part of it, the scene before me, does not articulate in any particular way just in being as it is; nor in any unique way full stop. Nor does what perception provides for me to respond to commit me to any one particular way of articulating it. This is related to the conceptual not being literally *in* the scene. Third, if the world is really going to bear, for me, *rationally* on what I am to think—with bearing of the sort it has on what is *so*—then perception had better provide me opportunity for exercising my capacities to link the nonconceptual with the conceptual—to recognising those particular instantings, each in its own way, of those ways for things to be which are in fact instanced. Hence, fourth, if I am equipped with capacities for making the world so bear—capacities which acts may well lack—there is no need for those capacities to shape that which I experience perceptually (visually). That would not just be *de trop*; it would spoil everything.

Finally (see point 1), if we needed to make bits of the *conceptual* objects of perceptual awareness, we would have to look elsewhere than the scene in view, where they are not to be found. We would have to look elsewhere, too, to find things that our conceptual capacities could shape. Where the peccaries are is, as noted, the wrong place to look. So it would be no surprise if here, just as with Evans and Peacocke, though in a different form, the wholly mistaken idea that only the conceptual can bear rationally on what to think *so*—that *rational* relations hold only *inside* the conceptual—drives us to posit inner objects of perceptual awareness, parts of every experience in which—if we are lucky—the world is revealed to us. But I neither know nor expect that John holds that wholly mistaken idea.

7. Hilary speaks of a face of the conceptual. He also speaks of a face of perception. He models both on the face of an expression in a face. When we say two faces have the same expression, he explains,

This is not like saying the mouths are the same length, the eyes the same distance apart; it is not that kind of description. But it is not a description of *something else*, the expression, distinct from that curved line, the dots, and so on. (p. 249)

Seeing an expression in a picture face is not just a matter of seeing the lines and dots; rather it is a matter of seeing something *in* the

lines and dots—but this is not to say that it is a matter of seeing something *besides* the lines and dots. (1999: 63)

What I have been trying to bring out above is that to see things which are present in this sort of way, one needs to have the nonconceptual in view; something on which to exercise capacities to link that of a sort to fall under given generalities with the generalities it in fact falls under. With that in view, there is no need for any other sort of experiential intake on which to base, rationally, judgements as to how things are in our environment. The best of John's work stresses the presence, in precisely this way, of a wide range of phenomena which have seemed intractable to philosophers who failed to recognise this form of presence—such things as virtues, or understanding, or personal persistence through time. He, if anyone, should have a hold on what this means for the nature of experience.

A recognition routine might settle whether a peccary is yonder by presence or absence of those distinctive stiff bristles. The routine would work only in amenable environments. If custom were to shave peccaries, or some other beast had the same bristles, it would not work. A conceptual capacity addresses the very different question what it is for something to be a peccary—what would and would not count (when). Is a butchered peccary in the shop window a peccary? Conceptual capacities are engaged in moving from routine to routine; from one way of recognising something to another. They get us from Newton's account of how to tell how much energy an object has to Einstein's, revealing one thing each would be right of in favourable circumstances. *Such* achievements may be beyond the reach of non-linguistic creatures. For all of which, (modulo differences in visual equipment) what they see remains what we do: none other than what may come as well before their, as before our, eyes

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17/07/08